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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the 
projected $1.7 million cost of notifying companies affected 
by two requests seeking potentially confidential information 
under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 1 and of 
evaluating those companies' responses, were properly 
chargeable to a commercial use requester as "review costs."2 
This is an issue of first impression in the courts of appeals. 
The United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey dismissed two counts of a four-count FOIA suit on 
the basis that plaintiff-appellant, OSHA Data/CIH, Inc., 
who had requested the data in question, was responsible 
for paying such costs to defendant-appellee, the United 
States Department of Labor,3 but that OSHA Data had 
indicated it was unable to pay these costs. OSHA Data now 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 5 U.S.C. S 552 (1994). 
 
2. The United States Department of Labor sought to undertake this 
notification process in order to determine whether any of the requested 
records might qualify as "confidential commercial information" within the 
meaning of Exemption 4 to FOIA. See 5 U.S.C.S 552(b)(4). 
 
3. To avoid confusion between the name of the appellant and the name 
of the agency, we will refer to the Department of Labor or any of its 
subdivisions, including OSHA (the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration), as "the DOL" or "the agency" rather than "OSHA." 
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appeals from the District Court's dismissal of these two 
counts (Counts I and II) of its action. We agree with the 
District Court that the costs of notification were"review 
costs" that OSHA Data was required to pay in connection 
with the agency's determination of the appropriate 
disposition of the FOIA requests, and will affirm the 
dismissal of Counts I and II. 
 
The District Court also dismissed the remaining two 
counts of the suit on mootness grounds. OSHA Data 
concedes that Count IV was moot but argues that Count III 
was incorrectly dismissed. We agree that Count III was 
properly dismissed as moot and will affirm the dismissal of 
this count as well.4 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. OSHA Data 
is a private business that collects regulatory compliance 
and enforcement information from various federal 
government agencies, repackages that information into 
computer databases and customized reports, and then sells 
the information to its clients.5See OSHA Data 
web site, Who We Are (visited June 1, 2000) 
<http://www.oshadata.com>; see also A. at 172 (statement 
of Philip D. Stern, counsel for OSHA Data). Among the 
governmental information gathered by OSHA Data is data 
from the DOL concerning workplace compliance with 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") 
requirements. The DOL routinely supplies this information 
to OSHA Data in the form of 9-track computer tapes, 
provided in response to OSHA Data's FOIA requests. 
 
At issue here are three separate FOIA requests for 
information from the DOL, which form the basis of the 
three counts in OSHA Data's complaint.6  Counts I and II 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As we mention below, we will also leave undisturbed certain 
intermediate rulings made by the District Court, including the District 
Court's affirmance of a stay issued by the Magistrate Judge. See infra 
n.20. 
5. OSHA Data is a New Jersey corporation with its primary place of 
business in Maplewood, New Jersey. See A. at 4-5. 
6. Although OSHA Data filed a First Amendment to Complaint adding a 
fourth count reflecting a fourth FOIA request, see A. at 49-50, the 
parties have since agreed that the records sought in this fourth request 
have been produced, rendering Count IV of the complaint moot. See 
OSHA Data Br. at 5; DOL Br. at 3. 
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seek certain records maintained by the DOL7 for calculating 
Lost Work Day Injury and Illness ("LWDII") rates for 
individual work sites. The LWDII rate for a particular 
workplace is the ratio of the number of incidences of 
serious injuries and illnesses to the number of employee 
work hours performed at that work site during a given time 
period. The information needed to calculate the LWDII rate 
is generated by the private employers themselves. 
 
OSHA Data's first FOIA request (Count I)8 sought data 
collected by the DOL in its 1996 "Data Collection Initiative," 
a massive information-gathering endeavor covering 
approximately 80,000 establishments in the manufacturing 
sector and in other industries; these industries were chosen 
on the basis either of high injury and illness rates or 
previous DOL inspection history. See A. at 5-6, 12, 16. The 
information obtained through the Data Collection Initiative 
included each establishment's name and address, the 
average number of employees who worked at that 
establishment in 1995, total employee work hours for 1995, 
numbers and kinds of occupational injuries and illnesses at 
the establishment in 1995, and whether those injuries and 
illnesses resulted in deaths or lost work days. See A. at 
146-49. The DOL would use this information to calculate 
injury and illness rates such as the LWDII rate. See A. at 
19. Much, but not all, of the data collected in the Data 
Collection Initiative paralleled information that employers 
had already been recording on a form called "OSHA Form 
200" or "Log 200." In the FOIA request that is the subject 
of Count I, OSHA Data requested the following: 
 
       [A] copy of all Log 200 data gathered from 
       approximately 80,000 employers under the so-called 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. These records are maintained by OSHA (the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration), which is a subdivision of the Department of 
Labor. 
 
8. The information at issue in Count I was requested by OSHA Data in 
a letter dated October 29, 1996. The information at issue in Counts II 
and III was requested on October 24, 1996, and September 12, 1997, 
respectively. Strictly chronologically speaking, therefore, Count I is the 
second request rather than the first; but we will refer to the Count I 
request as the "first request" and Count II as the "second request," to 
track the language in the parties' papers. 
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       "Data Collection Initiative" which began in February 
       1996. We specifically request the data include all 
       captured fields of information such as the 
       establishment name and address, name and telephone 
       number of person who provided the data, average 
       employment, hours worked, reporting period and the 
       calculated LWDI [sic] value itself. 
 
A. at 12 (Letter from Matthew M. Carmel, OSHA Data 
President, to DOL official Steve Newell, Oct. 29, 1996); see 
also A. at 5-6 (Complaint, First Count). 
 
OSHA Data's second request also sought information on 
LWDII rates. In contrast to the Count I request, which 
targeted information obtained via the Data Collection 
Initiative survey, the Count II request concerned 
information obtained during the DOL's inspections of 
approximately 7000 individual work sites.9  In addition to 
conducting the inspection, DOL compliance officers were 
directed to record injury and illness data from the 
establishments' Log 200 forms; this data was then recorded 
in a centralized DOL database, the Integrated Management 
Information System ("IMIS"). The database software would 
automatically calculate each establishment's LWDII rate 
from the information collected. OSHA Data sought the 
following information in its Count II request: 
 
       [A] copy of the Lost Work Day Injury and Illness (LWDI 
       [sic]) data calculated during OSHA enforcement 
       inspections and entered into the Integrated 
       Management Information System (IMIS) and current 
       through September 30, 1996. . . . We specifically 
       request the data include all captured fields of 
       information associated with calculation of the LWDII 
       such as the inspection activity number, number of 
       work hours, reporting period and the LWDII value 
       itself. 
 
A. at 32 (Letter from Matthew M. Carmel, OSHA Data 
President, to DOL official Bruce Beverage, Oct. 24, 1996); 
see also A. at 6-7 (Complaint, Second Count). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The industries that underwent these inspections were different from 
the industries covered by the Data Collection Initiative. Compare A. at 33 
with A. at 16-17. See also DOL Supp. App. at 1. 
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The Count III request sought certain computerized 
information relating to the DOL onsite inspections 
themselves. The Count III request is limited to information 
collected in the 30 days immediately prior to creation of the 
computer file tape. OSHA Data alleges that this FOIA 
request "was targeted specifically to address[DOL]'s new 
policy of withholding the most recent 30 days of 
information from the computer `derived' file supplied to 
FOIA requesters." OSHA Data Br. at 9; see also A. at 8-9 
(Complaint, Third Count). The DOL does not admit that it 
has such a policy. See A. at 63 (Answer, Third Count); DOL 
Br. at 51-53. The Count III request seeks the following 
information: 
 
       [A] copy of the sequential IMIS derived file. We 
       specifically request the file contain all available data 
       elements including the inspection, violation, 
       administrative payment, hazardous substance, 
       accident, related activity, debt, event history and 
       optional segments for all inspection records up to and 
       including the date of file tape creation. The requested 
       file period of coverage is 30 days. 
 
A. at 46 (Letter from Matthew M. Carmel, OSHA Data 
President, to DOL official Bill Wright, Sept. 12, 1997); see 
also A. at 8-9 (Complaint, Third Count). 
 
The DOL denied the Count I and Count II requests 10 and, 
thereafter, OSHA Data lodged administrative appeals of 
these denials.11 See A. at 5, 7. After awaiting resolution of 
the appeals for over a year, OSHA Data filed a three-count 
complaint in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, requesting an injunction preventing 
the DOL from withholding the records -- in effect, an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The DOL initially asserted grounds for withholding the records that 
are different from the grounds it now asserts. However, the agency may 
justify the withholding of documents under any applicable exemption to 
FOIA, even if it is not the exemption that was initially asserted. Cf. 5 
U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(B) (describing district court review of agency's FOIA 
decision). 
 
11. The DOL did not rule on the Count III request, because the DOL 
maintains that it has provided the data in question in response to later 
FOIA requests by OSHA Data. 
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injunction compelling the DOL to produce the records 
pursuant to FOIA.12 The complaint also contained a request 
for reasonable attorney's fees and litigation costs. The DOL 
moved to stay the matter as to Counts I and II, arguing 
that, because of potential issues of confidentiality, the 
agency was required to implement a process of notifying 
affected companies before it could finally determine whether 
the requested records were subject to disclosure under 
FOIA. The DOL asserted that this procedure was mandated 
by its own regulations, see 29 C.F.R. S 70.26(d), and that 
these costs, incurred in order to make a determination of 
whether disclosure was appropriate, were "review costs." 
The DOL further contended that OSHA Data, as a 
"commercial use" requester of FOIA records, was required 
by statute to pay all "review costs" in connection with the 
request, and that these "review costs" would include the 
costs of notifying the companies and evaluating their 
responses.13 
 
After an interim grant of the stay requested by the DOL,14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. OSHA Data later filed an amended complaint that included the now- 
moot fourth count mentioned above. 
 
13. The DOL projected these costs to total approximately $1.7 million. 
For the Count I request, the DOL estimated a cost of $1,554,250 -- 
$24,000 in mailing costs ($0.32 x 75,000 companies), $6,250 in 
preparing letters for mailing ($10/person/hour x 75,000 ö 120 
envelopes/hour/person), $1,500,000 for staff time reviewing the 
submitters' responses ($20/person/hour x 75,000 ö 1 
response/hour/person), and $24,000 for a second mailing. For the 
Count II request, the DOL estimated a cost of $145,063, using the same 
hourly rates for a base of 7,000 submitters. See  DOL Supp. App. at 1. 
 
It is worth noting that these are projected rather than actual costs. 
Should it occur that many of the companies contacted would not wish 
to object to disclosure of the requested information, the actual costs 
might be much lower, and of course OSHA Data would be responsible 
only for the actual costs. 
 
14. The DOL sought this stay to allow the agency the opportunity to 
contact the submitters of the information requested, so that the agency 
could determine whether this information fell under one of FOIA's nine 
exemptions to disclosure. This Motion to Stay was referred to Magistrate 
Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 636(b)(1)(A); Judge 
Cavanaugh granted the motion, ruling that the DOL was required to 
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the District Court ruled on the merits of OSHA Data's 
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts III and IV, and 
on the DOL's Cross-Motion to Dismiss, or in the 
Alternative, for Summary Judgment as to all counts. See A. 
at 321-50 (unpublished Letter-Opinion and Order of 
District Court, May 10, 1999). The District Court granted 
the DOL Motion to Dismiss as to all counts, and denied the 
OSHA Data Motion for Summary Judgment. The District 
Court found that OSHA Data, by stating its inability and/or 
unwillingness to pay the estimated $1.7 million"review 
costs," had demonstrated that it was not able to meet the 
conditions required for the lifting of the stay. The District 
Court found that OSHA Data was required to pay the costs 
of notification in order to pursue its claim, and dismissed 
Counts I and II based on OSHA Data's stated inability to 
pay.15 See A. at 340-41. The District Court dismissed 
Counts III and IV as moot, reasoning that OSHA Data had 
already received the information requested in those counts. 
Although OSHA Data conceded that it had received the 
Count III information as a result of subsequent FOIA 
requests, OSHA Data had alleged that Count III presented 
a scenario that was "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review,"16 A. at 343, and as such should be exempted from 
the application of the mootness doctrine. The District Court 
found that OSHA Data had not met its burden of showing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
undertake the notification and that it was appropriate to charge OSHA 
Data the costs of notification and mailing, as well as the costs of 
evaluating responses, as "review costs." See A. at 224-234. The District 
Court (Judge Alfred J. Lechner, Jr.) then affirmed the stay, interpreting 
it as a stay specifically of Counts I and II. 
 
15. The District Court denied summary judgment to both parties, 
reasoning that there remained a genuine issue of fact as to whether the 
requested records did in fact fall under an exemption to FOIA. The 
District Court also rejected the DOL's argument that Counts I and II 
should be dismissed on the ground that nonpayment constituted a 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The parties do not appeal 
these determinations. 
 
16. Perhaps the classic example of such a scenario is Roe v. Wade. See 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal 
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). 
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an exception to the mootness doctrine.17  See A. at 347. 
OSHA Data now appeals the District Court's order. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this case pursuant to FOIA, 5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(B), and 
pursuant to Congress's grant of federal question 
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. S 1331. We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
We review the District Court's dismissals of Counts I, II, 
and III de novo. See Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential 
Affiliates, Inc., 954 F.2d 869, 871 (3d Cir. 1992) (exercising 
plenary review over dismissal for failure to state a claim); 
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 
61 (3d Cir. 1991) (exercising plenary review over a district 
court's decision that a case is moot). 
 
III. FOIA and Its Allocation of Responsibility for Costs 
 
The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. S 552, was 
enacted in 1966 in response to Congress's perception that 
section 3 of the original Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. S 1002 (1964 ed.), did not provide for adequate 
governmental disclosure of information to the public. See, 
e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 & n.15 
(1979). Congress therefore structured FOIA to reflect "a 
general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless 
information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory 
language." S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965), quoted in 
Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 
(1976). As the District Court for the District of Columbia 
has succinctly described: "An agency may withhold 
documents responsive to a FOIA request only if the 
responsive documents fall within one of nine enumerated 
statutory exemptions. The agency bears the burden of 
justifying the withholding, and the [district] court reviews 
the agency claims of exemption de novo." Winterstein v. 
United States Dep't of Justice, 89 F. Supp. 2d 79, 80 
(D.D.C. 2000) (citations omitted). An agency can be sued for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. OSHA Data conceded that Count IV was moot. See A. at 348. 
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refusing to disclose information that it should have 
disclosed pursuant to FOIA, see 5 U.S.C.S 552(a)(4)(B); this 
is the type of suit that is before us in this case. 18 However, 
an agency can also be sued through the vehicle of the 
Administrative Procedure Act for allowing disclosure of 
information that was in fact covered by one of the nine 
exemptions to FOIA. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown , 441 U.S. 
at 317-18. This latter type of suit is commonly referred to 
as a "reverse FOIA" suit. 
 
FOIA contains provisions governing the circumstances 
under which a requester will be required to pay the costs of 
producing the records it has requested. As amended in 
1986, FOIA delineates three types of costs --"search 
costs," "duplication costs," and "review costs" -- and places 
requesters into three categories that determine which of 
these costs a given requester must pay. If a requester wants 
the information for a "commercial use," it must pay for all 
three types of costs incurred. In contrast, educational 
institutions and the news media are required to pay only 
duplication costs, and all other requesters are required to 
pay search and duplication costs but not review costs. See 
5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(A)(ii). OSHA Data agrees that it is 
making a request for "commercial use," and therefore is 
liable for all three categories of costs, including review 
costs. See OSHA Data Br. at 29. 
 
Prior to 1986, FOIA did not require commercial users to 
pay "review costs," and in fact the pre-1986 statute did not 
differentiate between requests for commercial use and 
requests for non-commercial use. Thus, by their very 
existence, the 1986 amendments reflect a desire to treat 
commercial uses differently from other uses, requiring that 
commercial users shoulder more of the costs of FOIA 
requests, rather than having taxpayers bear costs incurred 
in processing these commercial requests. See 5 U.S.C. 
S 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I) (reflecting language added via the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. FOIA explicitly provides that the district court shall review de novo 
the agency's determination that records are not subject to disclosure. 
See 5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(B). 
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Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99- 
570, S 1803, 100 Stat. 3207).19 
 
FOIA defines review costs as "only the direct costs 
incurred during the initial examination of a document for 
the purposes of determining whether the documents must 
be disclosed under this section and for the purposes of 
withholding any portions exempt from disclosure under this 
section." 5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(A)(iv). The DOL argues that the 
costs of notifying the affected businesses and evaluating 
their responses were "review costs," since they were part of 
the process of the initial review of the records in order to 
make the determination as to the applicability of Exemption 
4, the FOIA provision that exempts confidential commercial 
information from FOIA's disclosure requirements. 
 
IV. Discussion 
 
A. Issues Raised on Appeal 
 
The essential issues before us are: whether the costs of 
notification and evaluation were appropriately considered 
"review costs" by the DOL such that the DOL could assess 
these costs to OSHA Data, and could withhold the records 
based on nonpayment of these costs; whether the resort to 
notification was proper; and whether Count III was moot. 
We conclude that the District Court correctly held that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Legislative history and agency interpretations of the statutory 
language further flesh out the policies that are apparent from the 
language of the 1986 amendments themselves. The Office of 
Management and Budget, which is charged with issuing guidance on 
FOIA fees, see 5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(A)(i), has commented as follows on the 
1986 amendments: "[I]t seems clear that the Congress intended to 
distinguish between requesters whose use of the information was for a 
use that furthered their business interests, as opposed to a use that in 
some way benefitted the public. The amendment shifts some of the 
burden of paying for the FOIA to the former group and lessens it for the 
latter." 52 Fed. Reg. 10,011, 10,013 (1987); see also 132 Cong. Rec. 
29,616 (1986) (statement of Rep. English) ("[H]igher fees for commercial 
users will recover more of the costs of processing requests when one 
business uses the FOIA to seek information about another under 
circumstances in which there are no public interest aspects to the 
disclosure"). 
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costs of notification and evaluation were "review costs" 
which DOL would properly incur and for which OSHA Data 
was responsible, and that Count III was moot.20 
 
B. Applicable Law 
 
1. Review Costs 
 
The District Court determined that the anticipated costs 
of notification and evaluation were "review costs." OSHA 
Data argues that these are not the types of costs that are 
covered by the statutory and regulatory definitions of 
"review costs." 
 
FOIA itself contains a definition of "review costs": 
 
       Review costs shall include only the direct costs 
       incurred during the initial examination of a document 
       for the purposes of determining whether the 
       documents must be disclosed under this section and 
       for the purposes of withholding any portions exempt 
       from disclosure under this section. 
 
5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(A)(iv).21 The DOL regulations give 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. OSHA Data lists four separate "issues presented" on appeal. OSHA 
Data Br. at 2. Some involve procedural objections to intermediate 
decisions of the District Court, including the District Court's decision 
to 
affirm the stay and to affirm other orders of the Magistrate Judge. We 
will not address the procedural aspects of these interlocutory objections 
to the District Court's intermediate orders, as these aspects do not 
affect 
the outcome on appeal; it is a well-known general principle that 
interlocutory orders merge in the final judgment of the District Court. 
See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) 
(stating that 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and 1292 do not "permit appeals, even 
from fully consummated decisions, where they are but steps towards 
final judgment in which they will merge"). However, OSHA Data can of 
course attack the substance of the reasoning that underlies the District 
Court's order affirming the stay, since the substantive basis of this 
decision -- i.e., that the DOL was justified in charging the costs of the 
notification to OSHA Data as "review costs"-- is memorialized, and 
indeed specifically included, in the District Court's final order of May 
10, 
1999. See A. at 336-37. To the extent that these objections implicate the 
substantive issues presented by this appeal, we will dispose of them via 
our discussion of the merits, see infra section IV.C. 
21. FOIA also allows an agency to require advance payment of part of the 
anticipated costs when those costs are predicted to exceed $250. See 5 
U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(A)(v). 
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further substance to this definition of review costs, terming 
them the "costs associated with . . . [r]eviewing records to 
determine whether any materials are exempt." 29 C.F.R. 
S 70.40(a). The regulations define "direct costs" as "those 
expenditures which an agency actually incurs in searching 
for and duplicating (and in the case of a commercial 
requester, reviewing) documents to respond to an[sic] FOIA 
request," and further specify that these costs include 
employee salaries. Id. S 70.38(b). The regulations lay out a 
general rule as to when review costs can be charged to the 
requester: 
 
       [C]harges may only be assessed for review at the initial 
       level, i.e. the review undertaken the first time the 
       documents are analyzed to determine the applicability 
       of specific exemptions to the particular record or 
       portion of the record. Thus a requester would not be 
       charged for review at the administrative appeal level 
       with regard to the applicability of an exemption already 
       applied at the initial level. 
 
Id. S 70.40(d)(3). The regulations do not specifically make 
reference to, or provision for, the type of costs at issue here. 
 
2. Confidentiality and Notification Procedures 
 
The DOL argues that it had to follow the notification 
procedure, and incur the costs at issue, in order to 
determine whether any of the requested records22 fell within 
Exemption 4 to FOIA. Exemption 4 provides that an agency 
is not required to disclose "trade secrets and commercial or 
financial information obtained from a person and privileged 
or confidential."23 5 U.S.C.S 552(b)(4). If the information 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. The parties agree that the requested information qualified as 
"records" within the meaning of FOIA. See  A. at 279-80 (DOL's responses 
to interrogatories); OSHA Data Br. at 10. 
 
23. OSHA Data concedes that the information is commercial in 
character, and, with the exception of one piece of data (the LWDII rate), 
concedes that the information is obtained from a person. Employers are 
"persons" within the meaning of FOIA. See  5 U.S.C. S 551(2) (defining 
"person" to include "an individual, partnership, corporation, association, 
or public or private organization other than an agency"). OSHA Data 
contends that the LWDII rate is not "obtained from a person" because it 
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requested is "confidential commercial information" as 
described by the exemption, the agency need not release it 
pursuant to FOIA.24 
 
Therefore, the determination that the DOL would 
ultimately have to make is whether the information was 
"confidential" so as to be exempt from disclosure under the 
statute.25 The issue presently before us, however, is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
is a derived figure calculated by the DOL. See  OSHA Data Br. at 18. 
However, as it appears that the LWDII rate is merely a ratio calculated 
from individual components all of which are obtained from employers, we 
find that the LWDII rate, like the other information sought by OSHA 
Data, is "obtained from a person." 
 
24. The leading case interpreting Exemption 4 is National Parks & 
Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). National 
Parks lays out the following test governing the ultimate agency decision 
whether requested information is exempt from disclosure: 
 
       [C]ommercial or financial matter is "confidential" for purposes of 
the 
       exemption if disclosure of the information is likely to have either 
of 
       the following effects: (1) to impair the Government's ability to 
obtain 
       necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial 
       harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the 
       information was obtained. 
 
Id. at 770 (footnote omitted). 
 
25. OSHA Data argues as an initial matter that the Log 200 and LWDII 
information cannot be considered "confidential" because this information 
is readily available elsewhere. See OSHA Data Br. at 28-29; Reply Br. at 
7-13. It is true that DOL regulations require employers to post an annual 
summary of Log 200 data at the workplace itself, see 29 C.F.R. 1904.5, 
and that some information about workplace safety for selected work sites 
has been posted on portions of the DOL's World Wide Web site, see 
OSHA News Releases & Statements: Combined National & Regional Index 
(visited June 19, 2000) <http://www.osha.gov/media/oshnews>. 
However, we reject OSHA Data's argument that these limited 
disseminations of information render the Log 200 and LWDII data 
"officially made available to the public" such that predisclosure 
notification would not be required. 29 C.F.R.S 70.26(g)(2). As the DOL 
points out, see DOL Br. at 40-41, the posting of an annual injury and 
illness summary at the work site itself is a limited disclosure to a 
limited 
audience, a disclosure which is surely insufficient to render the data 
publicly available; similarly, the DOL's inclusion on its Web site of 
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whether the notification costs that the agency anticipates 
incurring in furtherance of this ultimate determination 
would be properly incurred by the DOL, and properly 
charged to OSHA Data. In this case, of course, the DOL is 
not arguing that the requested information can ultimately 
be withheld as confidential commercial information under 
Exemption 4; the DOL is merely arguing that it cannot 
provide the requested information without first ascertaining 
whether it is confidential commercial information within the 
meaning of Exemption 4. The DOL asserts that, as part of 
its process of determining whether the statutory exemption 
was applicable, it was required by its own regulations to 
undertake the notification procedures at issue, and that 
FOIA and these regulations permit the agency to charge the 
commercial requester the costs of these procedures. 
 
These regulations mandate notification whenever the 
DOL "has reason to believe that disclosure of the 
information could reasonably be expected to cause 
substantial competitive harm," 29 C.F.R. S 70.26(d)(2)(ii). 
The DOL concluded, and the District Court agreed, that the 
possibility of substantial competitive harm was sufficient to 
trigger the regulations mandating notification of the 
business submitters. That is, the DOL believed that it had 
to pursue notification so it could determine whether 
information requested by OSHA Data would ultimately 
qualify as "confidential" under Exemption 4. 
 
The notification procedures that are to precede the 
disclosure of potentially confidential information have as 
their genesis a presidential order. In 1987, President 
Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12,600 ("E.O. 
12,600"), entitled "Predisclosure Notification Procedures for 
Confidential Commercial Information." Exec. Order No. 
12,600, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,781 (1987). E.O. 12,600's stated 
purpose is "to provide predisclosure notification procedures 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
information on a few specific workplaces is not tantamount to a public 
dissemination of the entire Data Collection Initiative information. OSHA 
Data has not met its burden of producing evidence that the information 
it seeks in its FOIA requests has already been made public by the 
agency. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC , 873 F.2d 325, 343 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989). 
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under the Freedom of Information Act concerning 
confidential commercial information, and to make existing 
agency notification provisions more uniform." Id. at 23,781 
(preamble). The Executive Order directs agency heads to 
"establish procedures to notify submitters of records 
containing confidential commercial information." Id. (S 1). 
Section 3(b) of E.O. 12,600 provides that each agency head 
"shall . . . provide the submitter notice . . . whenever the 
department or agency determines that it may be required to 
disclose records . . . the disclosure of which the department 
or agency has reason to believe could reasonably be 
expected to cause substantial competitive harm." Id. at 
23,781-82 (S 3(b)). The Executive Order further states that 
the agency procedures should afford the submitter an 
opportunity to "object to the disclosure of any specified 
portion of the information and to state all grounds upon 
which disclosure is opposed," id. at 23,782 (S 4), that the 
agency "shall give careful consideration to all such specified 
grounds for nondisclosure" prior to making afinal 
determination whether the information is subject to 
disclosure, id. (S 5), and that, in the event the agency shall 
decide to disclose information following a submitter's 
objection, the agency shall provide the submitter with a 
written statement explaining its decision to disclose, see id. 
 
Pursuant to E.O. 12,600, see id. (S7), the DOL enacted 
regulations to govern predisclosure notification for requests 
that potentially triggered Exemption 4. These regulations 
contain language similar to that in the Executive Order. 
The regulations provide that the DOL "shall provide a 
business submitter with notice of a FOIA request," 29 
C.F.R. S 70.26(d)(2), whenever the DOL or its component 
agency "has reason to believe that disclosure of the 
information could reasonably be expected to cause 
substantial competitive harm," id. S 70.26(d)(2)(ii).26 The 
regulations also state that the agency "shall afford a 
business submitter a reasonable period within which to 
provide . . . a detailed statement of any objection to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. The DOL regulations also require notification when "[t]he business 
submitter has in good faith previously designated the information as 
commercially or financially sensitive information." 29 C.F.R. 
S 70.26(d)(2)(i). 
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disclosure"; such statement must "specify all grounds for 
withholding any of the information under Exemption 4." Id. 
S 70.26(e). 
 
According to the DOL, these regulations required it to 
notify the 80,000 affected businesses of OSHA Data's FOIA 
request so that the DOL could fulfill its responsibility to 
determine whether the information in question was subject 
to disclosure or whether it instead came under the 
confidential commercial information exemption to FOIA. 
 
C. Resolution of Issues Raised on Appeal 
 
OSHA Data argues that the District Court's assessment 
of the costs to OSHA Data was erroneous for two reasons: 
first, because these costs were not the type of costs 
encompassed by the statutory and regulatory definitions of 
"review costs," and second, because the agency had not 
shown a need for the notification procedures that led to the 
imposition of these projected costs. In furtherance of its 
first claim, OSHA Data asserts that the "initial examination 
of a document," for which review costs can be charged, 5 
U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(A)(iv), should be narrowly construed, and 
that the predisclosure notification and evaluation are not 
part of this initial examination. The construction urged by 
OSHA Data, in effect, equates "initial examination" with an 
"initial step" in the process.27 The DOL argues that the 
"initial examination" includes all relevant steps taken by 
the agency culminating in its decision as to whether the 
information is subject to disclosure or is instead exempt. 
DOL asserts that "initial examination" refers to the entire 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. OSHA Data states that "[i]n order to assert the need to notify 
business submitters, [the DOL] must have already conducted its `initial 
examination' " and thus cannot charge for any"additional" review costs. 
OSHA Data Br. at 30. Although OSHA Data does not (and cannot) 
dispute the fact that commercial requesters, due to their responsibility 
to pay "review costs," are generally required to shoulder more of the cost 
burden of FOIA requests than are other requesters, OSHA Data has not 
identified what costs incurred by the agency in this case would qualify 
as review costs. Thus, while in theory OSHA Data seems willing to bear 
costs beyond the costs of duplication and search, OSHA Data has not 
suggested what would be the permissible "review costs" in this case if, as 
OSHA Data argues, the notification and evaluation costs are not such 
costs. 
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process leading to the disclosure decision, and that the 
word "initial" is used primarily to distinguish this process 
from the process of "reviewing the materials again for 
purposes of applying the same exemption on an 
administrative appeal." DOL Br. at 21. 
 
While FOIA does not set forth a definition of"initial 
examination," we conclude that its language does not 
support OSHA Data's interpretation. The statute refers to 
"initial examination of a document for the purposes of 
determining whether the documents must be disclosed 
under this section and for the purposes of withholding any 
portions exempt from disclosure under this section." 5 
U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(A)(iv). It cannot be doubted that DOL 
proposes to undertake predisclosure notification and 
evaluation for exactly the purpose stated in the statute: to 
determine whether the documents must be disclosed or 
whether they are exempt from disclosure. Without 
complying with these notification procedures, the agency 
would have great difficulty engaging in any meaningful 
"review" so as to make that determination. Thus, we 
conclude that the statute suggests a broader reading of 
"initial examination," sufficiently broad to encompass the 
contested steps in the predisclosure decision making 
process. 
 
In addition, the DOL regulations described above are 
available to fill in the interstices in the statute; these 
regulations clearly suggest an interpretation of"initial 
examination" that mirrors the meaning suggested by the 
DOL. The regulations specifically state that costs may be 
assessed for "review at the initial level, i.e. the review 
undertaken the first time the documents are analyzed to 
determine the applicability of specific exemptions to the 
particular record or portion of the record," and clarify that, 
therefore, "a requester would not be charged for review at 
the administrative appeal level with regard to the 
applicability of an exemption already applied at the initial 
level." 29 C.F.R. S 70.40(d)(3). The regulatory language 
clearly supports the view that "initial examination" was 
being contrasted to "subsequent review on appeal," not the 
view that "initial examination" consists only of an agency's 
first internal look at the requested records. OSHA Data has 
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not challenged the validity of these regulations, and we will 
adopt the meaning apparent to us under the regulations' 
plain language. We therefore conclude that the expenses of 
predisclosure notification and evaluation are the types of 
expenses to which the term "review costs" was meant to 
apply. 
 
OSHA Data next contends that, regardless of whether 
notification costs fall within the general ambit of "review 
costs," the costs in this case should not be charged to 
OSHA Data because it was unnecessary for the agency to 
incur them. OSHA Data claims that the DOL had no reason 
to notify -- that is, that there is no basis for the DOL's 
determination that the information in question might give 
the agency "reason to believe that disclosure of the 
information could reasonably be expected to cause 
substantial competitive harm," the trigger for mandatory 
notification specified by the applicable regulations. 29 
C.F.R. S 70.26(d)(2)(ii). 
 
OSHA Data is, in essence, contesting the propriety of the 
agency's resort to the notification procedures. FOIA 
explicitly provides a right of action for requesters to contest 
an agency's ultimate decision to withhold data. See 5 
U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(B) (giving the district court jurisdiction, 
"[o]n complaint," to "enjoin the agency from withholding 
agency records and to order the production of any agency 
records improperly withheld"). It is well established that 
requesters can challenge the costs charged to them. See, 
e.g., 5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(A)(vii) (referring to an "action by a 
requester regarding the waiver of fees"). We construe OSHA 
Data's argument, then, as an argument that the 
assessment of "review costs" includes within it some 
determination that these review costs were reasonably or 
appropriately incurred.28 We will accordingly examine, as 
did the District Court, the DOL's basis for its decision to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. It is important to note that in this appeal, OSHA Data does not 
challenge the amount of the predisclosure costs estimated by the DOL; 
rather, OSHA Data challenges the agency's determination that it was 
necessary to incur notification and evaluation costs at all. 
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incur the notification and evaluation costs that it claims as 
"review costs."29 
 
As the District Court recognized, the DOL has provided 
several justifications for its decision to pursue predisclosure 
notification, all of which go toward assessing the risk of 
"substantial competitive harm." The DOL gives several 
reasons why it believed that some of this specific 
information might eventually be deemed to qualify as 
confidential under Exemption 4. First, the DOL had 
previously represented to submitters that it would maintain 
the confidentiality of their responses.30 See A. at 18-25. The 
DOL has also presented evidence that legislators and 
businesses consider information of this sort to be 
confidential because of its risk of causing "substantial 
competitive harm" if disclosed. See, e.g., A. at 143-44 
(Letter from Rep. Cass Ballenger, Chairman, Subcommittee 
on Workforce Protections, Committee on Economic and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. The district courts clearly have de novo  review over the ultimate 
agency decision to withhold records. See 5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(B). 
However, the parties have provided no guidance as to what standard of 
review a district court would employ in evaluating the reasonableness of 
the agency's intermediate decision to pursue predisclosure notification. 
Is 
this a case of an agency interpreting its own regulations (here, the 
predisclosure regulations) that might entail Chevron deference? See 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 
(1984); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-63 (1997). Or is it a situation 
where the courts review an adverse agency action for arbitrariness or 
caprice as provided for by the Administrative Procedure Act? See 5 
U.S.C. S 706(2)(A). Or does the de novo  FOIA standard apply? We need 
not decide this question, for we cannot say that the agency erred, under 
any standard of review, in making the decision to undertake 
predisclosure notification. 
 
30. The DOL asserts that, if the requested information were deemed to 
have been provided voluntarily by submitters, rather than provided 
pursuant to a compulsory regulation, the DOL would have an even more 
heightened responsibility to keep the information confidential. See DOL 
Br. at 33-34 (citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 
879-880 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc)). Because wefind that the DOL had 
ample justification for its decision to pursue predisclosure notification 
even under the assumption that the DOL compelled submitters to 
provide it, we need not reach the question whether the information was 
in fact provided voluntarily or by regulatory compulsion. 
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Educational Opportunities, to Charles Bowsher, 
Comptroller General of the United States, Nov. 12, 1996) 
(outlining confidentiality concerns stemming from the 
specific Data Collection Initiative at issue in this case); A. at 
196, 200-01 (Declaration of DOL official Emily Sheketoff, 
Apr. 27, 1998) (describing the basis for the confidentiality 
concerns expressed by representatives of Goodyear, one of 
the companies submitting Data Initiative Collection data). 
 
More important, as the District Court noted, at least one 
federal court has held that information similar to the 
workplace data in question here was competitively sensitive 
and therefore confidential within the meaning of Exemption 
4. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger , 392 F. 
Supp. 1246, 1249 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff 'd, 542 F.2d 1190 
(4th Cir. 1976) (superseded by statute on other grounds, 
see CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1141 & 
n.62 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The District Court concluded that 
Westinghouse provided support for DOL's contention that 
"[t]he information sought by OSHA Data could give a 
submitter's competitors insight into the productivity, hours 
worked, market share and production," and that the 
disclosure of such information could cause the submitter 
"substantial competitive harm." A. at 337 n.7. We agree. In 
Westinghouse, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia held that information appearing in a business's 
equal employment opportunity workforce report and 
affirmative action plan, could, if disclosed, enable 
competitors to calculate (via "reverse engineering") that 
business's labor costs and profit margins. See 
Westinghouse, 392 F. Supp. at 1249. Similarly, argues the 
DOL, a competitor could use information about a 
business's number of employees and employee work-hours 
to calculate estimates of that company's labor costs and 
productivity, which would give that competitor valuable 
inside information to assist its pricing strategies. 
 
In fact, previous litigation concerning the Data Collection 
Initiative itself has touched on confidentiality concerns. See 
American Trucking Assocs. v. Reich, 955 F. Supp. 4, 6 
(D.D.C. 1997) (noting employers' concerns about the 
confidentiality of the Data Collection Initiative). The DOL 
maintains that the District Court's order for injunctive relief 
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in American Trucking depended in part upon OSHA's 
assurance that it would keep the survey data for internal 
use only. See DOL Supp. App. at 3 (District Court order 
granting injunction, American Trucking Assocs. v. Reich, 
D.D.C. Civ. No. 96-552 (TPJ), Mar. 18, 1997); see also A. at 
200 (Declaration of DOL official Emily Sheketoff, Apr. 27, 
1998).31 
 
The issue before us as we examine this early stage of the 
DOL's process is whether disclosure of the information 
sought could lead to substantial competitive harm. The 
evidence produced was sufficient for this purpose. We are 
not faced with the ultimate issue for the agency, namely 
whether the information in the Count I and II requests was 
actually confidential and therefore covered by Exemption 4, 
and we take no position on this question.32 However, as the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. In addition, we cannot fault the agency's decision to exercise caution 
in making its determination whether the requested information was 
exempt from disclosure. As the DOL points out, the consequences of an 
agency's wrongful disclosure of records can be serious. The predisclosure 
notification regulations mandate notification and evaluation whenever 
the agency has "reason to believe that disclosure of the information 
could reasonably be expected to cause substantial competitive harm." 29 
C.F.R. S 70.26(d)(2)(ii). A submitter that believes that its information 
was 
wrongfully disclosed when that information should have been withheld 
can bring a "reverse FOIA" suit against the agency under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 
281, 318 (1979). Wrongful disclosure of information protected under 
Exemption 4 can even lead to criminal liability for an agency under the 
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1905. See CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 
F.2d 1132, 1151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1987). While the fact that wrongful 
disclosure can lead to agency liability cannot, standing alone, justify 
the 
agency's decision to undertake notification (under such a rationale, an 
agency could potentially justify mandatory notification whenever 
commercial information of any kind, no matter how innocuous, is 
requested), surely it is appropriate for the agency to consider its 
responsibility not to wrongfully disclose confidential information as well 
as its responsibility to disclose all information whose disclosure is 
mandated by FOIA. 
 
32. As Magistrate Judge Cavanaugh acknowledged, one can imagine 
information that is far more commercially sensitive than the information 
requested in Counts I and II. See A. at 188-89 (Transcript of Motion, 
Apr. 21, 1998, at 38-39). 
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District Court found, the evidence is clearly sufficient to 
surpass the much less onerous threshold of showing that 
the DOL acted appropriately in concluding that it had 
"reason to believe that disclosure of the information could 
reasonably be expected to cause substantial competitive 
harm," 29 C.F.R. S 70.26(d)(2)(ii).33 This standard for 
triggering mandatory predisclosure notification is obviously 
much less burdensome than the standard for justifying an 
ultimate withholding of information under Exemption 4. 
See supra note 24 (describing National Parks  standard). The 
DOL need not show that the disclosure of the information 
requested would cause substantial competitive harm, but 
must show only that the DOL had "reason to believe that 
disclosure . . . could reasonably be expected to cause 
substantial competitive harm."34 The totality of the evidence 
of the potential for substantial competitive harm that was 
available to the DOL at the time it assessed the need for 
predisclosure notification was sufficient to give the DOL 
reason to believe that substantial competitive harm might 
reasonably result from some of the disclosures in question. 
 
In summary, we conclude that the estimated $1.7 million 
costs for notification and evaluation were "review costs" 
properly chargeable to OSHA Data in connection with the 
notification procedure authorized by agency regulations, 
and that the District Court correctly dismissed Counts I 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. We note that the breadth of the Count I and II requests -- seeking 
information for over 80,000 companies -- makes it difficult for the DOL 
to determine whether the information falls under Exemption 4 without 
going through predisclosure notification. The inquiry into the likelihood 
of substantial competitive harm is a fact-based inquiry that evaluates 
the circumstances of the employer submitting the information. See CNA 
Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1152-53 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
Particularly in a case where, as here, the agency collecting the 
information is collecting it for the first time, see DOL Supp. App. at 11 
(Declaration of DOL official Miriam McD. Miller, May 12, 1998), it is 
unrealistic to expect the agency to be familiar with the competitive 
circumstances of each of 80,000 submitters without contacting those 
submitters for further information. 
 
34. It is clear that in order to prove that the agency had "reason to 
believe X," the agency need show something less than "X is true." (Here, 
"X" = "disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause substantial 
competitive harm.") 
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and II of the Amended Complaint based on OSHA Data's 
inability to pay these costs. 
 
D. Mootness of Count III 
 
OSHA Data concedes that it has received the specific 
data that were the subject of the Count III request. 
Ordinarily, the receipt of the data would render Count III 
moot. See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
NRC, 680 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that a 
federal court "is not empowered to decide moot questions 
. . . or to declare, for the government of future cases, 
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as 
to the thing in issue in the case before it") (quoting 
California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 
(1893)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, OSHA 
contends that Count III falls into the narrow category of 
controversies that are "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review" and thus constitute an exception from the 
application of the mootness doctrine. See Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 6 (1986). 
 
In order to qualify for this exception, OSHA Data has the 
burden of meeting both parts of the following test:"(1) the 
challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully 
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there 
was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining 
party would be subjected to the same action again." United 
States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 553 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting 
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)) (additional 
citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For much 
the same reasons as the District Court, we conclude that 
OSHA Data has not satisfied the second part of that test. 
 
OSHA Data alludes in its brief to a DOL "policy" of 
withholding the last 30 days of information from the 
computer file tapes provided in response to FOIA requests 
for data on violations uncovered during workplace 
inspections. See OSHA Data Br. at 9. However, the only 
record evidence that might point to such a policy consists 
of two letters from OSHA Data to DOL officials. See A. at 41 
(Letter from Matthew M. Carmel, President of OSHA Data, 
to DOL official Cathryn Goedert, Aug. 5, 1997); A. at 46 
(Letter from Matthew M. Carmel to DOL official Bill Wright, 
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Sept. 12, 1997). The first letter states that a DOL employee 
had informed OSHA Data that there was a "new policy" of 
not providing inspection records for establishments that 
were issued violations during the 30 days prior to the tape 
creation date. A. at 41. OSHA Data has not provided any 
direct documentation of such a policy. Although OSHA 
surely need not prove, at the complaint stage, that such a 
policy exists, the mere allegation of an agency policy does 
not satisfy OSHA Data's burden of showing that it is 
reasonably likely to be subject to the 30-day blackout 
period in the future. Similarly, the second letter, which 
alludes to a previous DOL "offer" to exclude most requested 
information within the 30-day period, does not satisfy this 
burden. OSHA Data does not include in the record the 
letter from the DOL in which this offer was allegedly made. 
 
As the District Court observed: 
 
       OSHA Data argues there are, and will continue to be, 
       quarterly requests for information contained in the 
       derived file. OSHA Data further argues that because 
       the Department of Labor has not stated it will cease 
       the practice of withholding the thirty day data, there is 
       a reasonable expectation OSHA Data "will be subject to 
       the same action." Accordingly, OSHA Data asserts 
       Count Three is not moot. 
 
        OSHA Data, however, has failed to demonstrate that 
       any of its future information requests will be denied as 
       a result of the operation of the alleged thirty day 
       exclusionary period. 
 
       * * * 
 
        OSHA Data commenced this matter on 22 January 
       1998. Since the commencement of this matter and the 
       filing of the OSHA Data Motion for Summary 
       Judgment, several quarters have passed. No argument 
       has been presented by OSHA Data to suggest that any 
       of the intervening quarterly requests for information 
       were impacted by the operation of the alleged thirty 
       day exclusionary policy. A. at 344-46 (District Court 
       Letter-Opinion, May 10, 1999). Thus, the District Court 
       concluded, OSHA Data had not shown a reasonable 
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       expectation that it would be subjected to the alleged 
       blackout period. See id. at 346-47.35 
 
We agree with the District Court's assessment. OSHA 
Data has not satisfied its burden of establishing that Count 
III falls under the category of claims that are"capable of 
repetition, yet evading review." We will therefore affirm the 
District Court's dismissal of Count III as moot. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
35. On appeal, OSHA Data has moved to supplement the record with a 
letter from DOL official Cathryn Goedert to OSHA Data President 
Matthew M. Carmel. OSHA Data asserts that this letter demonstrates 
that the DOL has applied the 30-day blackout policy to subsequent 
OSHA Data quarterly FOIA requests. We will deny OSHA Data's motion 
to expand the record. OSHA Data had ample opportunity to present this 
letter to the District Court, but failed to do so; the letter, which is 
dated 
December 4, 1998, came into OSHA Data's possession well before the 
District Court heard argument on OSHA Data's motion for summary 
judgment on Count III in February 1999 and ruled on this motion in 
May 1999. Our role as a Court of Appeals is to review the decision made 
by the District Court; we will do so based on the evidence presented to 
the District Court. 
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